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REMEMBERING NUREMBERG

BY BERNARD

D.

MELTZER*

Fifty years ago today, Justice Jackson, on leave
from the United States Supreme Court, and serving
as Chief of the United States Prosecution, delivered
his magnificent opening statement in the trial before
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
The trial, because of the horrors it addressed and the
purposes it sought to accomplish, has been viewed as
the greatest in this century, if not in history. The
road back to "Nuremberg"-which means both a
trial and a place-is, of course, well travelled.
Nonetheless, there are reasons, in addition to this
fiftieth anniversary, for another trip. "Nuremberg"
seems relevant-alas, too relevant-because of the
atrocities, the grim clich6s, of our own time, such as
so-called ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda and mass rape as an instrument of terror and territorial expansion. Finally, the memory of
Nuremberg is also evoked by the rise of neo-Nazism
in Germany and the United States, as well as by the
preachers of bigotry and separatism, everywhere.
And so, this afternoon, I hope initially to sketch
the trial's purposes, limitations, and the principal
criticisms surrounding it.
The way for the trial was paved by the Germans'
unconditional surrender on May 7, 1945, and by the
Allies' capture of the major surviving leaders of the
Nazi regime. On November 20, 1945, a little over
six months after the surrender, the trial of "the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis" before
the International Military Tribunal opened at the
Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, with the reading of
the hundred-page indictment. In the courtroom
were twenty-one defendants-the surviving major
leaders of the Nazi regime, such as Goering,
Ribbentrop, and Hess. All of the defendants pleaded
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Not Guilty. Seeing them in the dock, stripped of
their medals and insignia of power, one could scarcely believe that these men had dominated much of
the world and had terrified most of it.
The International Military Tribunal had been
established under the so-called London Charter
agreed to by the major Allies, that is, United States,
England, France, and the Soviets. Two of the principal authors of the Charter, representing the United
Kingdom and the United States, respectively, as had
been anticipated, served as Chief Prosecutors for
their governments. The Soviet draftsman later
served as a member of the Tribunal. The French
brought new people into those posts. The Charter
set forth the law that was to govern the trial.
Each of the major Allies appointed one judge and
an alternate to this military tribunal, who were,
however, civilians, except for the USSR judges. The
British judge, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, was elected the
Tribunal's President by the other judges; he
announced its decisions on procedural matters. His
election was apparently designed to play down the
numerical dominance of the Americans; our legal
staff was, I believe, bigger than the three other prosecution staffs combined.
Incidentally, the international trial is to be distinguished from so-called "Subsequent Proceedings,"
that is, later trials held at Nuremberg by only our
own government; other trials were also held elsewhere before other national tribunals.'
I am not sure why the Nuremberg Palace of
Justice became the situs of the trial of the Nazi leaders, but its choice surely meshed with a justice of
retribution. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 had been
part of a series of anti-Semitic measures that had
stripped German Jews of their citizenship and their
property and had excluded them from the government, the armed forces, and other important areas
of economic and cultural life. Beginning in 1934,
during Nazi party rallies in Nuremberg, Hitler
sought to seduce, deceive, and to terrorize his
potential adversaries and to fire up his followers.
When the trial began, Nuremberg was a pile of rubble; but the Palace of Justice and the prison adjacent to it had not suffered any substantial damage.
See generally, Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials,
No. 450 International Conciliation 243, 277 (April 1949).
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Albert Speer, a convicted defendant, said in his
diary that he could not help thinking that there had
been a deeper meaning to this almost.miraculous
survival of the Palace of Justice.'
In describing the international indictment, which
in general tracked the Charter, I will oversimplify a
bit. The first count charged a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace as well as war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
The second count charged the actual commission
of crimes against peace, namely, preparation and
waging of aggressive wars, which were also in violation of international treaties.
The third count alleged certain specified war crimes.
The fourth count alleged crimes against humanity, namely, extermination, enslavement or other
inhumane treatment of any civilian population
either before or during the war or persecution on
political, racial, or religious grounds.
The Charter rejected certain defenses, such as
acts of state and superior orders, which in combination might have immunized all the defendants.
Furthermore, in the trial of any individual member
of an organization, the Charter authorized the
Tribunal to declare organizations, such as the SS,
illegal. About those organizational provisions, I am
going to say only that they created overwhelming
practical and moral problems and were of little use.
The most criticized provisions of the Charter
were those making aggressive war an international
crime and providing for individual punishment of
those guilty of that crime. Critics challenged that
approach as incompatible with the principle that
punishment should not be imposed on the basis of
standards or penalties retroactively defined.
Before examining that criticism, it is useful to
recall the context out of which the Charter arose.
Before Germany's surrender, this is what reliable evidence had shown:
First, ruthless pre-war Nazi assaults on the Jews,
the churches, independent labor unions, and dissidents in Germany, as the Nazis achieved and consolidated their power.
Second, the deliberate and indisputable aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, most of the rest
2 See

Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, 52 (1976).
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of Europe, and then against the USSR and the
United States.
Third, as a result of those wars, the systematic
and massive pillaging, plundering, and devastation
of a continent, and the deportation of millions of
slave laborers, all centrally organized.
Fourth, the deliberate mistreatment and execution of POWs, the murder of millions of Jews, Slavs,
Gypsies, and dissidents. The murder of Jews had
occurred on so large a scale that it was then uncertain how many millions had been destroyed. But the
vast scope and general consequences of the Nazis'
Final Solution and the unspeakable horrors that had
attended it were known before the war ended.'
World War II has understandably been called
"the largest single event (and the Holocaust the
greatest crime') in human history."' It has been estimated that the war killed nearly fifty million, and,
for millions more, destroyed their towns and cities,
and left them wounded in mind and body.
Many of those horrors had, of course, been war
crimes, which for a long time had led to individual
punishment. But given the human misery resulting
from Nazi aggressions, Jackson, among others, found
such charges, based only on how the war had been
conducted, insufficient. It was necessary also to
impose individual punishment for the Nazis' aggressive wars, the supreme evil and the generating cause
of most of the other offenses and their attendant
agonies. Jackson urged, moreover, that the principles
against retroactive punishment, properly understood,
did not preclude punishment, in the circumstances
present.
Those principles are, as you know, designed to
avoid punishing one who when he acted had no reasonable warning that his conduct was culpable. That
rule was manifestly inapplicable to the Nazis. They
knew of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which had outSee generally, Martin Gilbert, "Final Solution," Oxford
Companion to World War 11, 364 (1995) [states, at p. 371, that six million Jews were murdered]; cf. J.A.S. Grenville, A History of the
Twentieth Century, 284 (1994) [historians cannot tell for certain to the
nearest million the huge number of Jews murdered]; David S. Wyman,
The Abandonment of the Jews, Ch. 2-4 (1984).
See, e.g., Leopold Gratz, President of the Austrian Parliament,
quoted in Arthur Spiegelman, "Head of Austrian Parliament Meets
Jewish Leaders," The Reuter Library Rept. (9/28/87), available in Lexis
News Library, Cumws.
5 See John Keegan, The Second World War, Foreword (1990).
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lawed war except in self-defense, and which had
been signed by an earlier German government. They
were aware of an impressive list of other international formulations explicitly or implicitly condemning
aggressive war as an international crime. They knew
that, given modern technology, the launching of
such a war was a terrible act. Not even Hitler had
been prepared publicly to claim the right to do so.
Thus, after the attack on Poland, Hitler, in a speech
to the Reichstag, contended that the Poles had
launched a war of aggression and that the Nazis had
acted only in self-defense. Hitler's aggressive "Poles"
had been concentration camp inmates forced into
Polish uniforms-a mordant bit of irony.
As Justice Jackson urged, the character of international law precluded the strict and automatic application of the rule against retroactivity. That rule has
flourished in comparatively well-developed legal systems but not in primitive or immature ones. Thus,
during the early development of our common law,
offenses, like killing and robbery, that had shocked
the moral sense of the community had been retrospectively transformed into crimes for which individual punishment was exacted. Similarly, individual
punishment for war crimes had become an established feature of international law without any
express provisions for individual punishment in
organic documents such as the Geneva Convention.
International law was at best a primitive system,
lacking a legislative body, and, like the early common law, dependent on case-by-case development.
The strict and automatic application of the principle
against retroactivity in such a system would have created too large a gap between the law and the developing moral sense of the world community. I'll skip
more intricate arguments that sought to avoid or
override the ex post facto label. In the end, the key
argument is that the principle against retroactivity
was a principle of justice and that the reasons behind
it were totally inapplicable to the Nazi leadership.
I was once convinced that the foregoing considerations trumped the ex post facto objection, but I am
now doubtful about that conclusion. It is undermined by the pre-1945 practices of nations.' The
6 See George A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International
Law," 41 Amer. ]. of Int. Law 20 (1947); Robert K. Woetzel, The
Nuremberg Trials in International Law, 166-69 (1960).
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most troubling events were the Soviet aggressions
against Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland.
Furthermore, the French, stressing the ex post facto
objection, resisted, even though they ultimately
acquiesced in, the inclusion of crimes against peace.
Like most European lawyers, they relied on a tradition of a code or a statute, which tended to be less
flexible and open-ended than the common law tradition.' To be sure, the idea of "crimes against
peace" met the emotional needs of the time, but it
also left a shadow on the trial.
Incidentally, the Charter and the Indictment had
raised another independent question of retroactivity
by appearing to include within "crimes against
humanity," governmental persecution and extermination of civilian populations in Germany, before
the outbreak of the war. The tribunal ducked that
question by folding crimes against humanity into
war crimes or into crimes against the peace, thereby
eroding any independent legal significance for
crimes against humanity.
Concerns about retroactivity seemed to sharpen
the question of whether judicial procedures should
have been used to determine guilt and impose punishment. For a time the United States and the
Soviets had flirted with the idea of executive punishment, which had been pressed by the British. The
British had proposed that the Allies would identify,
let us say, twenty-five or a hundred leading Germans
whose offenses had been serious and obvious and
shoot them, out of hand. Stalin, who was said to
have been pulling Churchill's leg, had raised the
ante to 50,000 Germans. But the Allies ultimately
decided to grant the defendants a hearing-a decision explained by Jackson with characteristic power
early in his opening statement. He declared:
That four great nations, flushed with victory and
stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and
voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant
tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason.'

7 See Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 65-66,
628, 629 (1992) ("Taylor").
See Robert H. Jackson, The Niarnberg Case, 31 (1947.)
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He added:
It may be that these men of troubled conscience,
whose only wish is that the world forget them, do
not regard a trial as a favor. But they do have a
fair opportunity to defend themselves-a favor
which these men, when in power, rarely extended
to their fellow countrymen.9
Nonetheless, some critics condemned the use of
judicial procedures to determine guilt and impose
punishment, urging that to do so would be to turn a
court into a political instrument by which the victors exercised their power to punish the defeated.
Thus, as Dennis J. Hutchinson has recently reported, then Chief Justice Stone privately labeled the
trial as a "high class lynching party." "oThese critics
urged that avowedly political means-that is summary executions by executive fiat-rather than
ostensibly judicial means-should be used for political punishments.
But that position ignored or dismissed the risk of
error involved in summary action whether it is based
on "principles of law" or executive fiat. That position was in essence an argument against due process.
Had it prevailed, it would no doubt have triggered
an outcry against the risks of prosecutorial error
aggravated by denial of the right to make a defense.
The acquittal of three Nuremberg defendants is a
powerful reminder of such risks. Indeed, it would not
be pleasant to defend today the summary execution
of individuals chosen on the basis of incomplete evidence, untested by an adversary proceeding.
A trial, moreover, also would respect the needs of
history and provide a record of the Nazi affronts to
civilization-a record that might serve an educative
and reformative role for the generation of 1945 and
beyond, in and outside of Germany. Such a record
might also, as Jackson urged, both foreclose responsible denial and avert martyrdom for the major leaders
of the Nazi regime. The evidence of the Holocaust
was so strong and palpable in 1945 that I doubt that
anyone then foresaw the so-called Auschwitz liethe recent denials that the Holocaust actually hap9 lbid, 34.
10

Dennis

J.

Hutchinson, "Justice Jackson and the Nuremberg

Trials," (forthcoming).
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pened. But the trial record surely serves as a corrective of such fantastic revisionism.
What I have said so far does not, of course, deal
with what was the central difficulty of the trial. The
governing law was not applied equally. The standards of guilt were applied only to the losers. For
example, the Soviets, who sat on the Tribunal, were
not forced to answer for Soviet aggression against
Poland, the Baltic States, or Finland. Nor were the
United Kingdom and the United States required to
face the questions raised, for example, by the bombing of Dresden and Hiroshima. To some, the unequal
application of the law, compounded by the Soviet
presence on the Tribunal, fatally compromised the
morality of the trial. To others, the Nazis' monstrous
barbarities and the fact that it was their aggression
that precipitated the ensuing horrors warranted the
apparently unequal application of the law.
Furthermore, Nuremberg merely reflects the troubling inequality. It didn't produce it. It has been the
product of an undeveloped and fragile international
system. Long before Nuremberg the victor had
applied an unequal standard, for example, in dealing
with traditional war crimes. The victor has punished
the misconduct of the enemy; similar conduct by his
own forces has largely gone unpunished. Unless we
had been prepared to comb our own ranks for violators of the rules of war, the logic of the inequality
argument would have required us to give the Nazis
complete immunity for all their crimes, war crimes
as well as crimes against the peace. Even the critics
shrank from that position. We were, I believe, justified in rejecting it, because of what was the overwhelmingly greater depravity of the Nazis and
because they had launched wars of aggression.
I want now to turn from those large legal questions to narrower problems regarding the content of
the Charter, the indictment and the conduct of the
trial. One set of problems arose from the need to
mesh different legal and political cultures. For example, the French were puzzled by the concept of a
common plan or conspiracy but acquiesced reluctantly in its inclusion in the charter." The Soviet
negotiator at first insisted that aggressive war should

1 See William M. Jackson, "Remarks," New York Law School, 4,
(April 4, 1995, forthcoming); Taylor, 581, 628, 629 (1992).
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be made a crime only when committed in the past by
the Nazis. Jackson held out for and secured a more
expansive prohibition-one addressed to the future
as well as the past. There were also inter-allied differences in the role of the indictment, the role of the
lawyers, and the importance of cross examination.
The Soviets were used to much more specificity in
an indictment; in crimes against the state at least,
the evidence set forth in the indictment was not
expected to be challenged but to be received as the
Truth, by the tribunal, and, as you know, accepted
often by the accused as well. The French and
Germans were used to an active judge who did much
of the investigating and questioning of witnesses.
Perhaps as a result, the French and German lawyers
were not skillful cross examiners; nor were the
Russians. These, and other differences that I'll
bypass, were bridged by workable compromises and
by recognizing within broad limits the discretion of
each prosecuting team to follow its own style.
There were also lively disagreements among the
U.S. prosecutors on issues of trial policy. The most
important issue was whether to rely primarily on
documents without much live testimony. Some
urged that live witnesses in the prosecution's case-inchief would spice up the proceedings. Jackson, however, decided to rely primarily on documentary evidence. Documents, although drabber, would be free
from the problems that live witnesses would entail
-bad memory, susceptibility to pressure, currying
favor, or turning the tables and making Nazi propaganda. Because of Jackson's policy, the case against
the defendants was proved by documents of their
own making, the authenticity of which was challenged only once or twice. Fortunately, the German
obsession for record keeping had made our case.
The defendants were afforded adequate opportunity to challenge and to meet the evidence offered
against them. They were allowed to pick their
lawyers from the German bar, or they could have
German counsel appointed for them. After some
logistical difficulties were solved, their lawyers
received a copy in German, of all the documents put
into evidence and could and did have witnesses and
documents subpoenaed. The defendants could and
did in most cases take the stand. Even critics of the
idea of a trial or of some provisions of the Charter
generally applauded the fairness of the trial.
9

In the end the Tribunal acquitted, as I said, three
defendants, sentenced twelve to die, by hanging, and
seven to prison terms ranging from ten years to life.
Only one defendant, Hess, was convicted of only
crimes against peace. The others convicted of such
crimes also were convicted of war crimes or crimes
against humanity. (Of course, their convictions for
crimes against the peace might have affected the sentences imposed on them.) The USSR dissented from
all the acquittals but dissented from only one sentence, life imprisonment rather than death for Hess.
Nuremberg, in its condemnation of aggressive
war, focused not only on the offenses of these defendants but also on establishing a precedent designed
to punish and to deter aggression in the future. But
at the time, so far as I know, the prospects for such
deterrence had not been closely analyzed. No one, of
course, had expected aggressive war to be completely
exorcised by the trial. The hope seemed to be that
the condemnation of aggression would bite into the
culture, affect public opinion, and constrain aggression by governments because of concern for domestic and foreign criticism or sanctions against an
offending nation, as well as individual punishment.
But the significance of those considerations for shaping official decisions about aggression-especially by
totalitarian governments-was far from clear. In any
event, after Nuremberg, there were plenty of aggressive wars, for example, in Korea, Afghanistan, and
the Persian Gulf-wars for which no individual punishment was imposed. Nuremberg may, of course,
have helped keep the number down and was
invoked to justify and organize resistance to the
Korean and Gulf aggressions. But the incidence of
aggression has been high enough to raise questions
about Nuremberg's deterrent effect-questions that
are sharpened by the difficulties of enforcing the
proscriptions of Nuremberg. Furthermore, it is
arguable that once an aggressive war breaks out, the
aggressors' fear of punishment might encourage them
to make a gambler's throw and to prolong the war
even when the probability of their winning is low.
I am going to leave those questions to those more
adept in speculating in futures and turn to my pastmy work in Nuremberg. My defense for this potential
exercise in anecdotage is, first, that it may give you a
sense of the grubby particulars, and, second, superior
orders from Holly Davis and Ellen Cosgrove.
10

I have often been asked: "How did you happen to
get to Nuremberg?" Well, it was just one of those
nice accidents that happen to lawyers. Frank Shea,
who had served as an Assistant Attorney General
under Jackson when he had been Attorney General,
became a senior member of Jackson's Nuremberg
staff. I had met Shea during my time in Washington,
and when he asked me to join the prosecution, I said
yes. The Navy indicated that it could take care of
the Pacific Theater without me, and I was off to
Nuremberg, via Washington and London.
Before I get to my own work, let me explain the
general order of proof. First, the prosecution introduced evidence of the Nazis' commission of crimes
alleged in the indictment. The responsibility for
introducing such evidence was divided among the
four Allied prosecutors, not without some overlap.
After the prosecution had introduced proof of general criminality, it focused on proof connecting each
defendant with the substantive crimes involved.
Then the defendants put in their evidence.
My own work dealt primarily with what was
called "the economic case," for which Shea had initially been responsible. Shea, incidentally, left the
prosecution's staff long before the trial began.
Anyhow, the economic case included first, crimes
against peace by defendants who had financed the
building of, or had built, the German war machine,
with knowledge of Germany's aggressive purposes;
and second, war crimes and crimes against humanity
resulting from the systematic plundering and pillaging of occupied territories, and the deportation and
exploitation of millions of slave laborers.
I coordinated and reviewed the work of a group of
lawyers, who assembled the evidence and prepared
trial briefs on the various aspects of the economic
case. Some of our briefs related to pillaging and
plundering in the East. After those subjects had
been allocated to the Soviets, we gave them our
briefs. Disclosure was, however, a one-way street.
The Soviet's disinclination to share information
reminds me of a story about Justice Jackson. At a
birthday party for him, he was given a Swiss watch,
the best of our PX's meager supply. After graciously
conveying his thanks, he asked: "Where did it come
from?" Before giving you the answer, I want to
remind you that Soviet soldiers loved a watch with
Mickey Mouse on its face even more than vodka. So
11

a wag's answer to the Justice was "from the
Russians." The Justice quickly replied: "That's fine,
that's fine. Up to now I haven't been able to get
even the time of day from them."
I also was responsible for preparing and presenting to the Tribunal the case against Defendant
Walter Funk, who had been charged under all four
counts of the indictment. Funk had joined the Nazi
party in 1931, and, as the Tribunal found despite his
denial, he had soon become one of Hitler's personal
economic advisers. Later, in March 1933, he had
become the Undersecretary of the newly established
Ministry of Propaganda, headed by the notorious
Joseph Goebbels, who had remained faithful to
Hitler until they both had committed suicide. As a
propagandist, Funk had had a significant part in
stimulating the persecution of Jews and other
minorities. He had succeeded Schacht as Minister
of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for the
war in 1938 and as head of the Reichsbank, in
January of 1939, three jobs crucial to war finance.
Funk was also involved with, although he did not
play a major role in, agencies that determined the
number of slave laborers required for German industry and called on others to produce them. He had
headed the bank when it had become the storehouse of the gold fillings, jewelry, eyeglass frames,
and other valuables stripped from the corpses of
concentration camp victims. Funk wept when confronted with this evidence pre-trial, but claimed
that he knew nothing about that ghoulish traffic.
The Tribunal concluded that he had known or had
not wanted to know.
By trial time, he was in poor health; he wept frequently as evidence of Nazi horrors piled up. His
apparent weakness as a man seemed to have served
him well as a defendant. The Tribunal noted that
he had been subject to the supervision of Goering
and found him not guilty under Count I (the conspiracy count), but guilty under the other three
counts and sentenced him to life imprisonment. He
was released from Spandau Prison in 1957 because
of ill health (after serving only ten years) and died
three years later.
In connection with my work on Funk and on economic crimes, I interrogated Goering and lesser figures, pretrial. Of those I met face to face, I found
Goering the most interesting, and most diabolical.
12

As Hilary Gaskin put it, he had the "charisma of
evil." " He was intellectually quick, verbally nimble,
and always wily. He often sensed the ultimate purpose of a question as soon as it was put. Incidentally,
he did very well in an IQ test, which all the defendants took, ranking just below Schacht. Goering was
completely unrepentant, and gloried in his role as
second to Hitler and the first of the named defendants. He assumed the responsibility for defending
the Nazi regime while attacking the laws of war as
obsolete. During the trial, he outpointed Jackson
during the latter's cross-examination of him-a
notorious defeat for Jackson. In the end, Goering
also managed a small triumph. He cheated the hangman by swallowing cyanide.
In addition to the economic case, I was quite
unexpectedly given another assignment that highlighted both the horrors of the concentration camps
and the Germans' obsession with records. About ten
days before the concentration camp case was to be
presented to the Tribunal, I was asked to work on that
presentation, which had been the responsibility of an
Army team, whose circuits had apparently been overloaded by mountains of evidence. I couldn't read
German, so I got help from two lawyers who could.
We had seven days to prepare the principal part of
the case that for many was the mark of the Nazi
regime. Other evidence of the pervasive role of the
camps had emerged or would do so in separate presentations concerning the Nazi attacks on, for example,
the Jews, labor unions, churches, and Gypsies. Indeed,
the movies taken by Allied troops showing the horrors of the camps when they had been liberated had
been presented to the Tribunal earlier-out of
order-as relief, if that is the word, from the tedium of
documentary evidence. Anyhow, my partners ran
through the files, fired up evidence, and I wrote as fast
and slept as little as I could. The evidence was a
lawyer's dream and a humanist's nightmare. It included two totenbuchs-deathbooks-that recorded
approximately 300 deaths at the Mauthausen camp,
deaths recorded as having occurred in alphabetical
order, at brief intervals of time, and in each case
because of heart disease. I still recall the hush in the
courtroom when those books were put into evidence.

12See Hilary Gaskin, Eyewitness at Nuremberg, xix (1990).
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Let me turn from evidentiary details to a brief
assessment of the legacy of Nuremberg.
First, the law of the London Charter has been
absorbed into international law. Nuremberg has also
helped promote the development of what is now
called humanitarian law, embodied in such instruments as the Genocide Convention. Enforcement is,
of course, a different matter.
Second, the trial was an important part of the
closure of World War II, validating the casualties
and devastation that the Allies had suffered and
inflicted; satisfying, in part at least, the demand of
the peoples of the occupied countries for a judgment
concerning, and punishment for, the crimes inflicted
on them; and helping, it appears, to reintegrate
Germany into Europe. Finally, although the law of
the trial has been generalized beyond the Nazi
defendants, the trial has remained essentially a product of its special time and circumstances.
The trials relating to the former Yugoslavia,
which have been so much in the news, arise from
vastly different circumstances. I can mention only
some of the major differences. The Balkan indictments are based on the authority of the U.N.
Security Council, and they charge not aggressive war
but only violations of humanitarian law. They certainly do not constitute victors' justice. Indeed, Dr.
Karadzic and General Mladic, the leaders of the
Bosnian Serbs, apparently the big territorial victors,
have been the subjects of two indictments. But in
the absence of the right kind of undisputed victors,
there may be no justice. Unlike the situation in
Nuremberg, key defendants and suspects are not in
custody but in power, presumably ready to resume
the war unless they can negotiate an acceptable
peace. Furthermore, even though the Bosnian Serbs
seem to have been the worst offenders, none of the
parties or forces involved appears to have clean
hands." Under all the circumstances, vigorous prosecution may be seen as an obstacle to peace rather
than as part of a process leading to a durable peace.
But Judge Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the
Balkan trials, has argued that genuine peace is not
possible unless the key suspects are handed over for
trials. He urges that otherwise the victims and their
See Charles Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty," Foreign
Affairs, Sept./Oct. 1995, 22.
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survivors will consider whole groups collectively
guilty, and that there will be no end to the cycle of
violence. But hard pressed negotiators may well be
tempted to trade justice for peace, apparent or real.
It would not be the first trade-off between politics or
prudence and individuated justice. Given the stated
commitment of the UN and the United States to try
to reach and punish the principal offenders, such a
bargain is likely to lead to frustration and cynicism
inside and outside of the former Yugoslavia.
Nonetheless, it is not for spectators-and especially
underinformed ones like me whose fellow citizens
are not now in the line of fire-to ask those who
have already suffered so much to risk more war so
that the prosecution may use the peace process in
order to get custody of the major indictees.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the Balkan
indictments, Judge Goldstone and his staff, have, I
believe, earned our gratitude for their skill, energy,
and tenacity. For they and their supporters have
shown their awareness of a charge not made at
Nuremberg but resonating from it-the charge, as
Elie Wiesel has reminded us, of the crime of silence
and indifference. In remembering Nuremberg, it is
right that we remember that charge-perhaps above
all others.
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